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A Tale of Two Countries: Parallel
Visions for Informed Consent in the
United States and the United Kingdom
ABSTRACT

In recent years, the proper role of informed consent doctrine
in an environment of healthcare cost containment has been a
hotly contested legal and policy issue. The purpose of this Note
is to probe the current informed consent debate in the United
States and the United Kingdom and to draw out the respective
roles informed consent ought to play in those two systems. In
doing so, this Note draws on the history of the doctrine and
several recent scholarly proposals, and offers a modest proposal
synthesizing the best aspects of those proposals.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The U.S. healthcare system is widely regarded as providing the
highest quality healthcare in the world.' Its healthcare system,
however, is by no means perfect, and it could be argued that it is not
the best of all healthcare systems. Although characterized by high
quality, U.S. healthcare is also plagued with problems of
overspending and relatively low per capita coverage compared to
healthcare systems of other developed countries. 2 Therefore, among
the primary goals of U.S. healthcare policymakers is to contain
healthcare costs while maintaining adequate levels of treatment.
While most would agree that reduction of healthcare costs is a
worthy goal, for decades the battle lines have been clearly drawn in
the United States between two contrasting visions of healthcare
3
delivery: the economic paradigm and the professional paradigm.
Those in the former camp envision a system that allows market forces
to perform an automatic regulatory role, such that patients are able
to make the kinds of cost-benefit decisions that typically face
consumers, while managed care organizations are free to invent
delivery structures that encourage cost containment. In other words,
the economic paradigm acknowledges a valid economic concern ("Is
the treatment worth the cost?") in addition to the traditional medical
concern ("Is the treatment beneficial?"). 4 In contrast, those who
adhere to the professional model would ask only the latter question.5
In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, where healthcare is
provided through a public delivery system with an overall
expenditure cap, 6 problems of overspending are not prevalent.
Despite this, British healthcare quality is adequate to serve the needs
of its population. 7 Many reasons have been offered for the lower levels
of spending in the United Kingdom, and indeed it is likely that U.S.
policymakers could learn some valuable lessons from the British

1.
Bureau of Labor Educ., Univ. of Me., The U.S. Health Care System: Best in
the World, or Just the Most Expensive? 1 (2001).
2.
See George J. Annas & Frances H. Miller, The Empire of Death: How
Culture and Economics Affect Informed Consent in the U.S., the U.K., and Japan, 20
Am. J. L. & Med. 357, 377 (1994).
Three years ago, the U.S. spent 131 percent more per capita on health care
than did Japan, and almost 200 percent more than did the U.K. For all that
expenditure, however, the U.S. trails behind the U.K., Japan, and many other
industrialized nations in such basic health-outcome measurements as infant
mortality, perinatal mortality, and male life expectancy.
3.
James F. Blumstein, Medicine Isn't an Economics-Free Zone, Wall St. J.,
June 22, 2001, at A14.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
See Annas & Miller, supra note 2, at 369.
7.
See id. at 377-78.
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approach that may inform U.S. policy strategies while leaving the
United States' tradition of treating medical care as a private good
undiminished.
In the midst of these contrasting systems and the varying
ideologies pertaining to healthcare delivery stands the problem of
informed consent. What role should informed consent play in each of
these different systems? Should its role be the same in both nations, or
is its proper function in the United States different from that in the
United Kingdom? This Note will summarize the current informed
consent debate in the United States and the United Kingdom and draw
out the respective roles informed consent should play in those two
systems. Part II of this Note describes the history of informed consent
law in the United States. Part III discusses current U.S. informed
consent proposals and concludes that a contract theory of informed
consent, supplemented by professional disciplinary proceedings, is the
best approach. Part IV tracks the history of U.K. informed consent law.
Finally, Part V discusses the current U.K. informed consent debate and
concludes that a model comprised of one-time global disclosure, broad
information availability, professional disciplinary proceedings, and a
new cause of action based on these new disclosure standards would
address the most pressing issues in the current U.K. informed consent
debate.

II. INFORMED CONSENT IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND
Many explanations exist for the high level of U.S. healthcare

spending. One cultural explanation is the tendency for U.S. doctors to
view death as failure, despite death's certain inevitability in the longrun and frequent inevitability in the short-run.8 The U.S. "frontier
spirit" has also been cited for culturally predisposing Americans (and
consequently U.S. physicians) toward action in the face of adversity,
manifested in the medical care context as a tendency to treat now
rather than waiting or acknowledging that further treatment will
yield little or no benefit or possibly even do more harm than good. 9 In
other words, Americans believe that "the main purpose of a man's life
is to solve problems." 0
Many commentators, however, point to causal connections other
than cultural predispositions, such as structural aspects of the U.S.
health care system. A classic example of a structural flaw in the U.S.
healthcare delivery system is the once dominant fee-for-service model

8.
9.
10.

Annas & Miller, supra note 2, at 388.
Id. at 361.
Id. at 361-62 (quoting Lynn Payer, Medicine & Culture 131 (1988)).
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of healthcare delivery. This model engendered a tradition of
superfluous delivery of care under the guise of medical necessity,
spurred on by the relative ease of passing on costs to both insurance
companies and the government, often viewed as impersonal
bottomless pits that are unaffected by the individual's relatively
small discrete expenditures.1 1 While the goal of managed care is to
reduce the overspending brought on by the fee-for-service world of
yesteryear, old habits die hard and vestiges of the old ways of
thinking about healthcare spending still surface in the practice of
defensive medicine, the technological imperative, and other common
12
utilization-increasing aspects of our health system.
It is apparent that the doctrine of informed consent is relevant to
the U.S. cost-containment debate. One way to illustrate the parallels
between informed consent doctrine and the overall approach to
healthcare delivery is to look to the lessons of history. The doctrinal
roots of informed consent can be traced back at least as far as the
eighteenth century ethical debate between Thomas Percival and John
Gregory.
Percival's ethics were characterized by opposition to any kind of
price or quality competition among physicians. 13 Furthermore,
Percival favored monopolistic self-regulation by the medical
profession. 14 "For Percival, the Enlightenment and rationality were
available only to the elites paternalistically bound to assuming the
burden of protecting the public." 15 In contrast, Gregory criticized the
16
monopolistic and paternalistic tendencies of the Percivalean ethic.
Gregory believed that the medical profession could benefit, as do
other professions, from a dose of competition (what he called "private
interest"). 17 However, Gregory felt that medical science and practice
were kept too secret for the public to adequately judge the merit of
18
particular physicians.
Even today, the tension between Percival and Gregory is felt.
The debate between the professional paradigm and the economic
paradigm centers on the ability of patients, as consumers, to
adequately digest medical information for the purpose of making
informed treatment decisions. 19 Proponents of the professional model,

11.
Id. at 362.
12.
Id. at 378.
13.
Jeffrey L. Berlant, Profession and Monopoly: A Study of Medicine in the
United States and Great Britain 82 (1975).
14.
Id. at 91.
15.
Id. at 93.
16.
Id. at 88-97.
17.
Id. at 91.
18.
Id.
19.
James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions of
Medical Care: Antitrust and State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 Cornell L. Rev.
1459, 1464 (1994).
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for example, tend to point to market failure-asymmetry of
information-as engendering the need for a monopolistic substitution
for the market in the form of a self-regulated, paternalistic
profession. 20 In contrast, supporters of the economic model might look
to professionalism as the cause of the market's difficulties, rather
than their cure. 2 1 The roots of professionalism are characterized by a
Percivalean tendency to discount the ability of patients to understand
medical information; in contrast, Gregory expressed concern that
patients were incapable of judging medical skill only because medical
22
information was kept too secret from them.
And yet, the realization that informed consent has significance in
the cost-containment debate is not sufficient. This realization leaves
unanswered the question, "How should informed consent be
structured in the managed-care era?" In Part III, this Note will
attempt to answer that question, but first this Note provides an
introduction to the historical development of the doctrine of informed
consent in the United States.
The doctrine of informed consent in the U.S. healthcare context
holds as its driving value the concepts of autonomy and selfdetermination. 2 3 These deep-seated values explain why U.S. courts
initially analyzed the duty to obtain a patient's consent to treatment
under the ambit of the tort of battery. 24 In the 1914 case of
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,25 where a doctor
performed surgery on a patient who consented to examination under
26
anesthesia but explicitly stated that "there must be no operation,"
Judge Benjamin Cardozo stated: "Every human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient's consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in
damages." 27 Therefore, plaintiffs in early informed consent cases were

20.
See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of
Medical Care, 53 Am. Econ. Rev. 941, 951 (1963).
21.
Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine 226-27
(1982).
22.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
23.
Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health
Care Cost Containment, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 261, 267 (1999).
24.
Clark C. Havighurst, James F. Blumstein & Troyen A. Brennan, Health
Care Law and Policy: Readings, Notes, and Questions 1093-94 (2d ed. 1998).
25.
105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
26.
Id. at 93.
27.
Id. This is one of the most commonly quoted assertions in U.S. informed
consent doctrine. See, e.g., Kathy L. Cerminara, The Class Action Suit as a Method of
Patient Empowerment in the Managed Care Setting, 24 Am. J. L. & Med. 7, 21 (1998);
Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 Ariz. L. Rev.
313, 317 (2002).
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required to show that their doctors made undesired contact with the
28
patient intentionally and without consent.
As surgery became more commonplace and surgeons' work more
trusted, however, the fear of unauthorized surgery became less
significant. 29 At that time, the judicial focus shifted from the
necessity of obtaining consent to that of obtaining adequately
informed consent based on full disclosure. 30 This judicial trend
toward the "informing" aspect of informed consent began with the
famous California case of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Junior University
Board of Trustees in 1957.31 Like earlier courts that heard informed
consent cases, the Salgo court framed its analysis in terms of the
battery cause of action; however, it was the first court to discuss what
disclosures were necessary to make a patient's consent informed: "A
physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to
liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the
basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed
'32
treatment.
This new legal issue of determining the proper amount of prior
disclosure
of medical
information naturally
led to the
recharacterization of the tort as a breach of a professional duty; 33 in
other words, a breach of the duty to obtain informed consent before
34
treatment was often treated as a form of professional negligence.
This treatment of informed consent under a professional negligence
standard began to take hold with the Kansas Supreme Court's 1960
decision in Natanson v. Kline,35 which adopted Salgo's reasoning but
did so in the malpractice context as opposed to battery. 36 The
classification of the doctrine of informed consent under the heading of
professional negligence is currently the dominant view, 37 and the
battery cause of action is typically reserved for situations where
38
physicians act with no consent at all or with evil intent.
To prevail in a professional negligence case, a plaintiff must
show (1) that the physician had a duty to disclose certain types of
information to the patient, (2) that the physician breached that duty,

28.
See Restatement (First) of Torts § 13 (1934).
29.
Havighurst et al., supra note 24, at 1094.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.; see Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
32.
Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181.
33.
Havighurst et al., supra note 24, at 1094.
34.

Id.

35.
350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960).
36.
Id. at 1106 (citing Salgo for the rule that physicians have a duty to make
only "those disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would make under the
same or similar circumstances," and thus indicating that a malpractice standard
applies in informed consent cases).
37.
Havighurst et al., supra note 24, at 1094.
38.
Id.
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(3) that the plaintiff sustained an injury, and (4) that the physician's
breach of duty proximately caused the injury. 39 The duty and breach
issues are usually analyzed together. The existence of a duty on the
part of the doctor to make some sort of disclosure tends to be taken
for granted; however, the proper standard for determining what
disclosure is required is an important matter in malpractice
litigation, and a matter on which the states vary. 40 The rule in the
majority of states is what one would expect in a professional
negligence action, namely that the physician must disclose only the
information that a reasonable medical practitioner in the same or
41
similar circumstances would disclose.
Several jurisdictions, however, follow the rule established in
Canterbury v. Spence.4 2 In Canterbury, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit abjured a standard based on professional custom as
"arrogat[ing] the decision on revelation to the physician alone" 43
based on general standards of divulgence, despite the fact "that the
myriad of variables among patients makes each case so different that
its omission can rationally be justified only by the effect of its
individual circumstances. ''44 Based on these considerations, the court
reasoned that the duty to inform arises from phenomena apart from
customary practice 45 and determined that a patient-centered
standard was more appropriate given the patient's self-determination
interest. 4 6 Under this standard the physician must disclose all
information material to the patient's decision. 47 In addition, the test
for materiality is objective, based on a reasonable-person test: "[A]
risk is ...material when a reasonable person, in what the physician
knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to
attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether
'48
or not to forego the proposed therapy.
Some have argued that despite the move to a patient-based
standard, this objective rule is not faithful to the underlying ethical
concern for patient self-determination, because it ignores whether the
disclosure was adequate for the specific patient making the treatment

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
Consent to

Id. at 992.
See generally Havighurst et al., supra note 24, at 1094-99.
Id. at 1094; see, e.g., Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1106.
464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (applying District of Columbia law).
Id. at 784.
Id.
Id. at 786.
Id.
Id. at 786-87.
Id. at 787 (quoting Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed
Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. Rev. 628, 640 (1970)).
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decision. 49 While this is a valid concern, one questions whether
imposing liability based on a subjective, patient-based standard of
disclosure might render physicians, who typically are unaware of the
intricacies of each patient's personal preferences, unable to avoid
liability for nondisclosure. Of course, if the ultimate goal is to
encourage more disclosure, a subjective rule would likely achieve that
end. As far as this Author is aware, there are no courts adopting a
subjective disclosure standard.
Managed care raises interesting questions regarding the
categories of disclosure that will be required. As noted above, the
doctrine of informed consent originated at a time when medicine was
less sophisticated and surgery was relatively new. 50 These
circumstances combined with the fee-for-service nature of U.S.
healthcare delivery for most of the twentieth century, gave rise to a
risk of the forcing of unneeded medical care on patients.5 1 In the
modern managed-care environment, however, where medicine is
much more trusted and where physician incentives are to decrease
utilization, physicians are often in a position to exploit patients'
naivet6 by denying them the benefit of needed treatments. 52 Here, the
doctrine of informed consent plays a very different role when
requiring doctors to ensure that their patients are adequately
53
informed before giving their consent.
Some cases indicate the possibility of physician liability not only
for nondisclosure of the risks of recommended treatments, but also for
nondisclosure of the risks of nontreatment, 54 for nondisclosure of
provider-specific risks,5 5 and for financial incentives potentially
affecting physician decisionmaking.5 6 In Truman v. Thomas, for
example, the defendant gynecologist testified that he had often
recommended to the patient that she get a Pap smear; however, he
did not discuss with her the full range of risks associated with the
failure to do so. 57 The patient who chose to forego the Pap smear,
eventually died of cervical cancer, and her minor children brought
suit against the gynecologist.58 Reasoning that the California
requirement that doctors diclose all information material to the
patient's decision implied a requirement that the physician share

49.
For a brief discussion of this issue with citations to other commentators, see
Havighurst, et al., supra note 24, at 1099.
50.
See id. at 1094 (indicating that the battery characterization of informed
consent violations became less apt as surgery became less risky and more accepted).
51.
See id. at 1125.
52.
Id.
53.
See id.
54.
See, e.g., Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902 (Cal. 1980).
55.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996).
56.
See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
57.
611 P.2d at 904.
58.
Id.
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material information regarding the risks of foregoing the
recommended course of treatment, the court held that the physician
may have breached the duty of care he owed to the plaintiff. 59 In
Johnson v. Kokemoor, the plaintiff contended that the patient, who
had died as a result of the surgery at issue, should have been
informed of the operating surgeon's particular success rates as
compared with other surgeons. 60 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
agreed, holding that where physicians have substantially different
success rates, the choice of physician is a choice between treatment
alternatives, triggering disclosure of the success rate data under the
Wisconsin informed consent statute. 61 Finally, in Moore v. Regents of
the University of California,the plaintiff, a leukemia patient, alleged
that during the course of his treatment his treating physicians
collected samples of his blood, blood serum, skin, bone marrow
aspirate, and sperm, and removed his spleen without informing him
that his unique blood components likely had great commercial and
research value. 62 He further alleged that the physicians went on to
patent a cell line using his cells, naming themselves as the
inventors. 63 The California Supreme Court held that such allegations
of failure to disclose research and economic interests in the plaintiffs
treatment established a claim for failure to obtain informed
consent.6 4 It should be noted, however, that the holdings in Johnson
and Moore are unusual in the medical context,6 5 although the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has handed down a ruling similar to
66
Moore for ERISA fiduciaries.
The remaining element of an action for breach of the duty to
obtain informed consent to treatment is causation. The plaintiff must
show that failure to obtain informed consent was a proximate cause of
the injury or, stated differently, the patient would have decided not to
undergo the treatment if the patient had been adequately informed of
the risk. 67 Alternatively, in the case of a suit for nondisclosure of the
risks of non-treatment, the patient would have consented to the

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 906--7.
545 N.W.2d at 499-500.
Id. at 507.
793 P.2d 479, 481 (Cal. 1990).

63.
64.

Id. at 481-82.
Id. at 483,

65.
Havighurst, et al., supra note 24, at 1114 (stating that the holding in
Johnson "is unusual"); Krause, supra note 23, at 340 ("Moore is a single case arising in
a state with a traditionally broad informed consent doctrine, and no other jurisdiction
has adopted its holding to date.").
66.
See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628-29 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that an
administrator of ERISA plan had duty to disclose compensation arrangement designed
to induce physicians to make fewer referrals to specialists).
67.
Havighurst et al., supra note 24, at 1100.
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treatment if adequately informed. An issue exists as to whether the
causation element can be satisfied in cases alleging nondisclosure of a
68
risk other than the risk that actually led to the injury.
Just as with the standard for disclosure, states differ as to
whether an "objective" or "subjective" causation test is appropriate in
informed consent cases.6 9 Many courts have adopted an objective test,
asking the jury to determine whether, if properly informed, a
reasonable, prudent patient would have chosen differently.70 Such an
objective test neutralizes the effects of the plaintiffs testimony
regarding causation, which is likely tainted with self interest and
"20/20 hindsight."'
Of course the already injured patient now
believes that he would have chosen to forego the harmful treatment if
he had known about the risk.
Like. the objective disclosure standard, however, the objective
test for causation is often criticized as being unfaithful to the
underlying ideal of individual autonomy and self-determination.7 2
Consequently, many courts have adopted a subjective test for
causation, asking instead whether this particular patient would have
foregone treatment if adequately informed. 73 While the subjective test
satisfies the desire for the furtherance of patient autonomy, it
introduces the risk that distorted plaintiff testimony regarding the
importance of the omitted disclosure will be given too great an effect.
Probably as a result of this tension, the cases seem to evidence a
74
blurring of the distinction between the two tests.
One final aspect of U.S. informed consent doctrine is the
enactment in many states of informed consent statutes 75 after the
twentieth century trend toward vindicating patient autonomy
through more patient-oriented analysis ran against the tort crises of
the 1970s and 1980s. 76 Although patients were viewed more as
rational consumers of healthcare during this time, the patient
autonomy championed by evolving informed consent doctrine was
77
minimized in the face of pressure to limit physician liability.
Over half the states now have informed consent statutes. 78 These
statutes tend to take one of two general approaches: (1) listing of the

68.
Id.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
72.
See id. ("Is the objective test for causation true to the professed purpose of
giving individual patients a chance to choose for themselves?").
73.
Id.
74.
Id. at 1101.
75.
See generally id. at 1116-18 (discussing consent statutes enacted in several
states).
76.
Id. at 1116.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
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required types of disclosure coupled with a presumption of informed
consent if the enumerated disclosures are made; or 2) listing of the
elements of the cause of action based on failure to obtain informed
consent as well as the defenses to such a cause of action.7 9 Within this
basic framework, the statutes address a variety of issues relating to
informed consent which are not within the scope of this Note. Suffice
it to say that one exhaustive survey of the early informed consent
statutes found that they tended to be "little more than window
80
dressing, creating the appearance of change without the substance.
Moreover, many state legislatures attempted to replace subjective,
patient-oriented
standards with the professional
test for
81
appropriateness of disclosure.
III.

WHAT SHOULD INFORMED CONSENT LOOK LIKE IN THE UNITED
STATES?

Having become broadly familiar with the current state of U.S.
informed consent doctrine, the all-important normative question
remains: "What should informed consent look like in the United
States?" Needless to say, commentators have come forward with
many proposals for the role informed consent ought to play in
managed care. Four major lines of thinking are outlined this Part.
A. Specific Informed Consent Proposalsin Recent Years
82
i. Mark A. Hall's Theory of Economic Informed Consent

Professor Hall's theory of advance contractual consent to
nondisclosure argues that when an individual subscribes to a
managed care plan, he is in effect consenting to a rationing scheme,
'8 3
or a "bundle of unspecified refusals of marginally beneficial care.
As a basis for this claim, Hall advocates the "global disclosure" of cost
containment mechanisms at the time of enrollment and reenrollment,
reasoning that despite the rarity of such disclosures in current
practice, there is no justification for failing to inform HMO

79.
Id.
80.
Alan Meisel & Lisa D. Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment:
An Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 407, 562-63 (1980).
81.

Havighurst et al., supra note 24, at 1118.

82.
Mark A. Hall, Making Medical Spending Decisions: The Law, Ethics, and
Economics of Rationing Mechanisms 194 (1997) [hereinafter Hall, Making Medical
Spending Decisions]. See generally Susan M. Wolf, Toward a Systemic Theory of
Informed Consent in Managed Care, 35 Hous. L. Rev. 1631, 1665-68 (1999) (describing
Professor Hall's theory).
83.
Hall, Making Medical Spending Decisions, supra note 82, at 194.
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subscribers of plan incentive structures.8 4 Hall recommends adding
five items of disclosure to current disclosure practices: (1) a commonsense explanation of managed care's broader goal of containing costs
through eliminating expensive, marginally-beneficial care; (2) a
description of who exercises authority over which medical spending
decisions; (3) a general explanation of the sources of the rules that
govern decisionmakers, coupled with availability upon request of
copies of those rules; (4) a fairly specific description of the financial
incentives that affect physicians' recommendations; and (5) an
explanation of what patients can expect to be told when treatment
options of potential benefit to the patient are not recommended due to
cost.8 5 As to this fifth recommendation, Hall proposes an example:
Our medical professionals will provide a range of treatment options
that is reasonable and standard for this kind of insurance in this part of
the country and this practice setting. However, they will not always
point out where their professional judgment differs from those who
practice under more expensive forms of insurance or who follow
different styles of medical practice. Patients are always free to ask
questions about their course of recommended treatment. Those
questions will be answered honestly and thoroughly, including requests
for second opinions or for information about how to obtain treatment
that is not available under this insurance plan. However, patients may
not demand payment by us for treatment that is more expensive than
this plan allows or that, in the view of our medical professionals,
86
exceeds appropriate medical standards.

Hall then asks what effect such prior consent should have on
doctors' duty to inform patients of non-treatment decisions under the
rationing scheme. 87 He argues that requiring physicians to make
such disclosures at the treatment decision point would be
impracticable. 88 Physicians will often subconsciously engage in
implicit rationing, and if forced to disclose the underlying tradeoffs,
they run the risk of undermining patient trust.8 9 Furthermore, just
as the patient self-determination ideal is often sacrificed because of
practical concerns, "pristine informed consent [can] be compromised
in the resource allocation situation as well." 90
Thus, Hall argues that "enrolling with an HMO constitutes
blanket advance consent to the subsequent denials of marginally
beneficial care brought about by the rules, procedures, and incentives
disclosed at the outset (and periodically affirmed through annual
open enrollment decisions); thereafter, additional disclosure at the

84.
Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 Ga. L. Rev. 511,
520-21 (1997) [hereinafter Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent].
85.
Id. at 582-84.
86.
Id. at 584.
87.
See Hall, Making Medical Spending Decisions, supra note 82, at 193-239.
88.
Id. at 204.
89.
Id. at 205.

90.

Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, supra note 84, at 551-56.
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time of treatment is unnecessary." 91 This general allowance of
nondisclosure does not apply, though, where the patient questions the
physician. 92 Nor does Hall insist that this theory of advanced consent
ought to apply to all treatment decisions; rather, he excludes from its
coverage certain high stakes decisions, such as refusal to consent to
life support or treatment decisions having significant consequences
on the patient's ability to make a living. 93 Finally, Hall recognizes
that his theory of consent would be illusory if patients were not given
choices either between plans or between various options within a
94
plan.
An alternative theory submitted by Professor Hall is the theory
of "silent rationing."95 Under this theory, subscription to the plan is
not viewed as an advance consent to rationing, but rather as "a
waiver of the right to be informed when such decisions are made." 96
The practical result of this waiver theory is the same as that of
advanced consent: physicians generally are not required to disclose
non-covered treatment options, except in the face of patient
questioning or high stakes medical decisionmaking.
ii. Peter H. Schuck's Call for Contextualization
Professor Peter Schuck emphasizes "the need to contextualize
informed consent" by "tailoring the law's requirements more carefully
to the different settings in which risks arise and are discussed,
assessed, and acted upon."9 7 In furtherance of this theme, Schuck
proposes a reassessment of informed consent along four paths: (1)
subjection of informed consent doctrine to cost-effectiveness analysis,
(2) use by physicians of more meaningful and understandable
methods of communicating risks to patients, (3) movement away from
a monolithic informed consent doctrine inattentive to the variety of
contexts in which consent is sought, and (4) legal enforcement 98of
patient-plan contracts over the characteristics of informed consent.
Schuck first argues that informed consent doctrine should be
"paid the compliment of taking it seriously" enough to subject it to
systematic cost-effectiveness analysis. 9 9 "Talk, especially busy
doctors' talk, is not cheap. Genuinely probing conversation . . . is
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95.
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Hall, Making Medical Spending Decisions, supra note 82, at 211.
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Id. at 226.
Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, supra note 84, at 576-81.
Hall, Making Medical Spending Decisions, supra note 82, at 224.
Id. at 216.
Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 Yale L.J. 899, 906

(1994).
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Id. at 905-06.
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dearer still." 10 0 He argues that the many costs of informed consent,
from the costs of doctors' time to the mental and emotional costs for
patients of processing the information, should be weighed against the
various benefits of different levels of disclosure. 1 1 While
acknowledging the potential difficulties inherent in attempting to
comprehensively estimate the costs and benefits of informed consent,
Schuck maintains that there is no principled reason why such an
estimation cannot be achieved10 2 and recommends two possible
starting points: direct time-cost measurements based on physician
10 3
surveys and cross-national comparative analyses.
Schuck recognizes that in an age of cost containment, current
informed consent doctrine may not pass cost-benefit muster given its
high costs.' 0 4 However, he argues that such a result is not
preordained. 0 5 Rather, analysis might reveal that approaching the
ethically ideal version of informed consent would produce benefits,
perhaps in the form of autonomy and outcome enhancement, that are
10 6
worth the costs.
Schuck's
second recommendation
relates to
physician
communication styles. Reasoning that the goals of informed consent
cannot be achieved unless physicians communicate reliable risk
information in an intelligible and meaningful fashion, he points to
studies and commentary indicating that actual informed consent
practices fail to satisfy these minimal standards. 0 7 Schuck cites
language and concepts used by physicians in characterizing risks as
an important reason for this failure.' 08 General terms such as "high"
or "insignificant" and ambiguous terms such as "may" or "probably
will" give the patient little basis for assessing risk in a refined way.' 0 9
At the same time, more exact quantitative terminology like numerical
percentages is too "remote[ ] from any referent that is real or palpable
to the patient" to be useful as a decisionmaking tool. 11
To make risk information more meaningful for patients, Schuck
asserts that physicians should change the way they describe risk. 1"'
He recommends that doctors characterize medical risks in terms of
other risks that are more accessible to the patient, such as describing
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to the risk of
the risk associated with a treatment as being equivalent
1 12
experiencing a collision while driving home at night.
One may question the practicability of such an approach; indeed,
Professor Schuck himself indicates that a comparative risk approach
is problematic.1 13 The first concern is whether comparative risk
information can even be made available to physicians in a form they
can properly use without committing the statistical fallacies that are
common even among experts.1 1 4 Schuck, however, submits that there
is no principled reason such information cannot be supplied,
particularly since the number of comparisons made available need
not be any larger than the number of risk categories physicians
already use in discussions with patients.1 15 Nevertheless, he concedes
that simple equivalences can be dangerous given the fact that the
tolerance for particular risks is a personal matter that varies greatly
in
from patient to patient. 116 But he considers this fault acceptable
117
discussions.
risk
current
of
failure
extreme
the
to
comparison
Professor Schuck's third proposal involves adaptation of
informed consent to the various contexts in which the doctrine is
applied. 118 He views current informed consent doctrine as "largely
monolithic and noncontextual (except insofar as it employs
,reasonableness' terms and contains certain exceptions to the general
duty to disclose)" and indicates a need to contextualize and
differentiate the doctrine.1 19 Pointing to the tobacco litigation of the
1990s, where jurors imputed informed consent to the plaintiff-victims
despite the serious suffering experienced by the victims and the clear
evidence of the defendants' causal role in that suffering, Schuck
recommends that policymakers consider why informed consent might
120
be more easily imputed in some contexts than in others.
Much as he did with his cost-effectiveness and comparative risk
be
proposals, Schuck concedes that answering this question would 122
121
impossible.
not
is
it
principle
in
that
maintains
he
Still,
difficult.
In support of this claim, he points to anecdotal evidence indicating
that mothers retain a great deal more of the information their
obstetricians provide about risks, tests, and alternatives than do
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patients in most other contexts. 123 He also offers as an example a
claim that informed consent should be imputed in the case of mass
vaccines, where the risks are low and the benefits are very great to
the individual and to others, much more readily than in the case of
silicone breast implants, where the risk-benefit relationship is much
more questionable and the choice is highly personal. 124 According to
Schuck, a properly contextualized informed consent doctrine might
vary according to the nature of the treatment, the treatment setting,
the number and type of available alternatives, the degree of medical
uncertainty, and the special characteristics of the particular patient,
among other factors. 125 Additionally, an informed consent doctrine
would differentiate between elective and non-elective treatments,
between primary- and tertiary-care providers, and between one-time
126
and long-term treatments.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Schuck extends his
127
contextualization argument to the realm of individual preferences.
In his words,
some patients seem to prefer leaving some or all medical treatment
decisions to their physicians, accepting their ignorance about the risks
they face but placing trust in their physicians to "do the right thing" for
them. Others appear to act in the same way even though they may in
fact simply be too intimidated or anxious to behave otherwise. Still
others-I call them
(us) 'information junkies'-more closely
approximate
the conventional "rational consumer" model of
decisionmaking, treating medical treatment decisions more or less like
12 8
other consumption decisions with respect to the information sought.

He criticizes the law's current treatment of all patients and
physician-patient relationships as homogenous, suggesting that this
view deprives patients of the right to choose different levels of
consent with which they would be more satisfied and for which they
would be willing to pay. 129 This result is ironic given the key role
choice plays as the underlying rationale for informed consent doctrine
130
in the United States.
Pointing to two advantages of the existing uniform approach,
that it is cheaper to know and enforce and that it protects patients
against gross inequalities of bargaining power versus providers,
Schuck rejects these rationales given the growing organization of the
healthcare market and the increasing monopsonistic power held by
large group purchasers of healthcare who can act as proxies for their
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members. 131 He proposes that under these conditions, such group
purchasers should be allowed to bargain over a variety of informed
consent issues, such as standard dialogue procedures, amount of
discussion, types of disclosures to be made, alternative dispute
resolution, institutional liability, and others. 132 In Schuck's view,
such bargains should be enforced under appropriate circumstances,
such as when the patient is a member of an organization that truly
represents the best interests of its members or when the provisions at
issue can plausibly be said to have advanced the patient's interests
133
(viewed ex ante) and no overreaching or lack of consent is present.
134
iii. Susan M. Wolf's Systemic Vision

Professor Susan M. Wolf envisions a systemic theory of informed
consent. 13 5 Criticizing the narrow focus of Hall and others on whether
prior or presumed consent reduces the amount of required dialogue at
the treatment decision point, 13 6 Wolf stresses the importance of the
flow of events leading up to the treatment decision. 137 First, a worker
accepts a job, thereby limiting his health plan options. 138 Next, he
chooses a health plan, whether it be one of many available plans or
the only plan offered by his employer. 139 Then the subscriber must
choose a primary care physician. 140 The treatment decision in the
context of a particular health condition arises only after all of these
choices have taken place. 14 1 At every stage of this process,
information is being given or withheld that affects the patient's later
treatment options and decisions. 14 2 Thus, the current focus on the
point-of-treatment decisionmaking reflects a failure to approach
informed consent doctrine systemically. 143
Wolf first submits that, both before job acceptance and at plan
enrollment, the employee should be informed of the content of the
health plan or plans offered by the employer, including the plans
exclusions and its rationing incentives. 144 It is argued that such
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disclosures are necessary for the subscriber to subscribe knowingly
and select a primary care provider knowledgeably and for the plan to
resolve its conflict of interest.1 45 Wolf also argues that the prospective
primary care provider has a duty to disclose the financial incentives
to which he is subject and his particular "rationing and disclosure
styles.

'1 4 6

Finally, Wolf addresses disclosure at the point of treatment
decision. 14 7 Wolf avers that the patient ought to be informed not only
of diagnosis and treatment options, but also of the factors that play
into the doctor's decision regarding which treatments he will
recommend.148 Because managed care plans are so large and
complex, the patient needs the physician to explain the extent to
which plan exclusions and discretionary physician rationing play into
the physician's disclosure decisions for the patient to properly
evaluate the physician's advice and decide whether or not to get a
second opinion. 149 Such disclosure, as well as disclosure of the full
range of available treatments, is also necessary for resolving the
physician's conflict of interest. 150 In addition to the duty to make such
wide-ranged disclosures, Wolf suggests that physicians ought to
perform "economic advocacy" for their patients, going to bat for them
against the plan when rationing rules threaten inappropriate harm to
151
the patient.
According to Wolf, a patient's need for disclosure is increased by
what she calls "feedback loops": informational pathways via which
patients are apprised of the facts necessary for determining whether
52
or not to remain with their plan and primary care provider.'
Without such information, patients as consumers cannot conduct
quality control within the healthcare system by walking away from
53
unacceptable plans.'
iv. Joan H. Krause's Statutory Model
Professor Joan Krause presumes that the major informed
consent problem to be dealt with during this era of cost containment
is the need for disclosure of noncovered treatment alternatives. 1 54 She
acknowledges that patients in this new era of medical consumerism
do not merely have more rights; indeed, they also have more
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responsibilities. 155 Patients, however, need access to adequate
information, including information about cost containment incentives
and excluded, care to make decisions for which they should be held
responsible. 15 6 Krause believes HMOs tend to utilize policies that
15 7
discourage such disclosure, both explicitly and implicitly.
Despite the great deal of public attention focused on gag clauses
in provider-plan contracts, Professor Krause views the gag clause as a
"paper tiger, a perfect foil for anti-managed care activists," given
evidence that these provisions do not significantly affect physician
practice. 158 Rather, she looks to implicit incentives to withhold
information, such as "termination without cause" provisions and
internalization of cost containment decisions, as the real root of the
nondisclosure problem. 159
Professor Krause concludes that despite the common assumption
that physicians are required to disclose treatment alternatives
generally, this requirement is rarely given much weight in
practice. 16 0 Therefore, because traditional informed consent law has
not been successful at protecting the patient's right to information
regarding treatment alternatives generally, it surely cannot be
counted on to protect the patient's right to information regarding
161
noncovered alternatives.
Krause criticizes prior contract theories of informed consent and
prior proposals to reform tort law as incomplete solutions, although
she does seem to think there is a place for such ideas. She first
examines Professor Hall's contract theory, concluding that it is
impressive but too limited to be effectual. 162 Because Hall would
apply his theory only to care that is of marginal benefit and not to
high stakes or value-laden treatment decisions, Krause argues that in
the end, his proposal is more descriptive than corrective of modern
informed consent practices. 163 Furthermore, she claims that to
expand Hall's theory to include high-stakes and value-laden decisions
164
would controversially limit patients' informed consent rights.
Krause views current proposals to improve tort and ethical doctrines
as similarly insufficient, but does advocate two reforms in these
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areas. 165 She first recommends a reconfiguration of tort law in terms
of emphasizing dignitary interests and the importance of process,
with a view to relating tort law more closely to the self-determination
interest in which it is rooted. 166 In the ethical arena, Krause
advocates a clear bifurcation between the duty to provide information
and the duty to provide care, so that the mere inability to provide a
certain treatment does not provide an excuse not to disclose the
existence of that treatment. 16 7 In Krause's view, disclosure of
beneficial but non-covered treatment options has the potential to
protect the relationship of trust between patient and physician, which
is sometimes threatened by the existence of financial incentives that
168
create physician self-interest.
Krause's unique contribution to the body of informed consent
literature, however, is her reconceptualization of informed consent in
statutory terms, based on lessons she has drawn from breast cancer
informed consent statutes. 169 She views these statutes as significant
because they typically (1) provide for the creation of standardized
summaries of treatment alternatives; (2) adopt strictly medical
criteria for determining appropriate disclosure; and (3) impose
professional discipline penalties, as opposed to restricting patients to
170
tort remedies, against violators.
First, while praising the usefulness of treatment option
summaries, Krause acknowledges that it would be virtually
impossible to summarize every medical treatment category. 171 In the
alternative, she suggests that it might be beneficial to create
summaries only for a defined list of medical conditions for which
informed consent is considered particularly important. 172 Such a list
173
might include cancer treatment and invasive surgical procedures.
While alluding to the possibility that this listing approach might
provide a good supplement to a global waiver approach like that
espoused by Professor Hall, Krause nevertheless sees this partial
listing as unsatisfactory for dealing with day-to-day disclosures
174
regarding minor care.
Krause also argues for the use of exclusively medical criteria,
such as "medical viability," for determining the types of disclosure
that will be required. 175 Her main concern in making this argument
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appears to be that other types of standards, like "availability," run
the risk of being interpreted as allowing financial considerations to
play into the disclosure decision. 17 6 Moreover, she makes little of the
potential for controversy arising from such standards in view of the
paucity of case law generated by the breast cancer statutes on the
1 77
issue of which disclosures are required.
Finally, Krause points to professional discipline provisions as
perhaps the most important aspect of the breast cancer informed
consent statutes. 178 To the extent that the goal of policymakers is to
deter nondisclosure, as opposed to compensating patients who have
suffered purely dignitary harms with large monetary awards,
professional discipline is a very effective model. 179 Professional
discipline relieves the plaintiff of the burden of proving causation and
focuses solely on the underlying issue of whether the physician made
the proper disclosures.18 0 In addition, the dispute would be handled
by medical professionals, which Krause argues is more fitting because
professionals are more capable of making decisions based on purely
medical considerations.'18 Still, Krause does not take the loss of
monetary awards lightly, suggesting that perhaps the best approach
would be a combination of tort and disciplinary models, with
violations resulting in physical harm to patients being actionable in
tort.182 While it is true that this would disadvantage those who have
suffered dignitary harms vis-A-vis those who have suffered physical
harm, Krause argues that such an approach is desirable because it
legitimizes the dignitary interests that underlie informed consent
doctrine while minimizing excess tort liability.' 8 3 After all, the tort
system is not always the best instrument for protecting patient
184
rights.
B. A Synthesizing Approach
Each of the above proposals has strengths and weaknesses to
varying degrees. Might a synthesizing approach combine the
strengths of each while minimizing their weaker points? A proposal
achieving this result would undoubtedly resemble some of the above
proposals more closely than others but could conceivably contain
elements of all. This Subpart examines the four proposals outlined
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above and attempts to synthesize them into a finished product that
incorporates the best elements of each. The examination begins with
a look at some of the perceived shortcomings of the various
approaches.
Professor Schuck's contextualization argument is strong but
suffers from many drawbacks. The first is found in the following
words: "no principled reason why not."18 5 Indeed in three of his four
major proposals, Schuck indicates that the necessary legwork would
be difficult but is not impossible.1 8 6 Meanwhile, he offers very little in
the way of explanation as to why these various tasks can in fact be
accomplished.
For example, Schuck states that he has been unable to find any
quantitative measurement of the costs and benefits of informed
consent, but sees no principled reason why such a calculation would
be impossible.1 8 7 He does offer direct physician time-cost
measurement as a possible approach; 88 however, such an approach
would not meet up to his own requirement that all types of cost,
including emotional costs and the like, would need to be measured to
conduct a truly comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis.18 9 Schuck
also suggests that cross-national comparisons might shed some light
on the costs and benefits of various informed consent practices, 190 but
it is not clear, given the uniqueness of the U.S. healthcare system
generally and U.S. informed consent doctrine particularly, that such
comparisons would go very far in achieving any kind of genuinely
probing analysis of the costs and benefits associated with informed
consent. It is a true strength of Schuck's proposal, however, that he
seeks to subject informed consent doctrine to the same cost-benefit
analyses to which nearly all policy choices are subjected. 19 1 However,
perhaps such analysis need not be directly quantified. Rather it

185.
This claim appears in Schuck's defense of three of his four major proposals.
See Schuck, supra note 97, at 944 (claiming that there is no reason why costs and
benefits of informed consent cannot be quantitatively measured); id. at 950 ("There is
no reason in principle why health care physicians cannot be supplied with comparative
risk information that is systematically designed to be used in conversations with
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might more appropriately be perceived as an influential background
principle that policymakers would do well to keep in mind.
Similarly, Schuck indicates that, although accurate comparative
risk information is difficult to convey and difficult to marshal, "there
is no reason in principle" why physicians cannot be supplied with
such information in a usable form. 192 Statistical risk analysis is
notoriously difficult, such that even experts in the field sometimes
make common cognitive errors. 193 Thus, while it may be possible to
deliver such information to some physicians in a form that they can
use, 194 it is doubtful whether all physicians would be able to
effectively utilize such risk descriptions to the betterment of their
patients' understanding. In addition, as Schuck acknowledges, the
simple equivalencies envisioned by comparative risk discussion are
further limited in their effectiveness by the varied ways in which
different people view particular risks. 195 Still, comparative risk
discussions are not necessarily useless. Perhaps, rather than being
viewed as the be-all and end-all of disclosure styles, comparative risk
explanation would be more properly treated as a valid and effective
option among the various risk disclosure styles available, including
explanation in terms of percentages and less specific explanations.
Schuck makes a similarly unsubstantiated claim regarding the
capacity ("at least in principle") of policymakers to ascertain the
many factors that contribute to differentiation between informed
consent contexts. 196 Schuck himself submits a list of factors that
probably should be considered, indicating that there are "perhaps
other[s]. 197 Yet it is not evident that all of the factors contributing to
differentiation can be readily ascertained. Furthermore, assuming it
may be possible to create a comprehensive list of the most important
factors informing contextualization, it seems that it would be
exceedingly difficult to outline a comprehensive approach to applying
those factors to different practice contexts. It is difficult to envision
such a comprehensive approach to differentiation being taken up by
legislators; however, surely such differentiation is appropriate. Again,
perhaps the more appropriate vision is that of a toned-down
differentiation between the different contexts in which consent is
sought, seen as an appropriate background consideration.
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Perhaps the strongest aspect of Schuck's proposal is his call for
differentiation in the realm of individual disclosure preferences. 198
Schuck correctly recognizes the differences among individuals with
regard to these preferences and importantly notes the irony behind
the denial of disclosure choices in the name of informed consent (with
its underlying interest of self-determination): in this way, the law
denies patient choice in the name of patient choice. 199
Schuck acknowledges the strengths of a unitary standard of
disclosure: it is cheaper to adminiser, and it protects patients in
situations characterized by unequal bargaining strength. 200 He
argues, however, that these reasons for uniformity are seriously
weakened by the growing complexity of the healthcare market and
the increasing bargaining strength of group purchasers acting on
behalf of patients. 20 1 Schuck argues that patient choices regarding
desired levels and types of disclosure ought to be enforced where
circumstances are appropriate (e.g., where proxies can truly be said
to have acted in the interest of their members or where proxies can
20 2
honestly be said to have advanced the patient's interests).
Professor Wolf s systemic proposal appears to suffer a major fault
which largely weakens its force: her vision of informed consent is
impracticable because it would consume too many resources, as can
be seen from a quick recap of the disclosures she would require. First,
Wolf calls for a disclosure at the time of job acceptance of the content
of the health plans the employer offers. 20 3 Next, she asserts the
necessity of similar disclosures at the time of plan enrollment. 20 4
Then, when the plan member begins to shop for primary care
providers, each prospective provider is required to share not only the
rationing incentives that affect his decisionmaking but also his
particular "rationing and disclosure styles. '20 5 The standards for
determining whether a physician has sufficiently disclosed his
particular "style" are not elaborated upon, and the costs of conducting
such dialogue are not discussed. Finally, at the point of the treatment
decision, Wolf demands "physician disclosure of the full roster of
relevant treatments as well as the medical and economic
considerations affecting the physician's recommendation. '206
The cost of such far-reaching disclosure requirements cannot be
overstated. In the words of Peter Schuck, "Talk, especially busy
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doctors' talk, is not cheap. '20 7 The failure of Wolfs proposal to
address the cost issues of her widespread disclosure requirements is
its primary downfall and cannot be ignored in today's cost-conscious
world.
That said, Professor Wolf s proposal does evince two major strong
points: (1) its emphasis on systemic thinking and (2) its focus on the
importance of feedback loops. First, Wolf reasons that good informed
consent policy should take into account the structure of the entire
managed care system. 20 8 It is safe to say that any policy which does
not adequately consider the unique structure and aims of managed
care runs the risk of failing to adequately address the concerns raised
by that structure and those aims. It does not necessarily follow,
however, that widespread disclosure at every structural level is the
only way to effectively address managed care's systemic concerns.
Second, Wolf stresses the importance of feedback loops as a quality
20 9
control instrument for patients in an age of medical consumerism.
This, too, is a useful contribution to the thinking on informed consent.
As is the case with systemic analysis, however, extensive disclosure
at every step in the health-plan process is not necessarily a
prerequisite for enabling the patient to judge the performance of his
210
or her provider and plan.
Professor Krause's narrow focus on disclosure of noncovered
treatment options 2 11 assumes away the difficult question: "Should
noncovered options be disclosed?" If a patient specifically asks about
noncovered treatment options, surely the physician is required to
answer honestly. And if the stakes are very high, surely the physician
should discuss every treatment alternative with the patient, even
those that are not covered. But what about the day-in, day-out
healthcare decisions, in situations where patient concern does not
reach a level sufficient to provoke them to ask questions about other
options? Under certain circumstances, might full disclosure of all
likely beneficial options be excused? These are difficult questions, and
the answers are not immediately obvious. Hence, it may be that
Krause needs to examine her presuppositions.
Krause, however, does submit some useful ideas. For instance,
while she admits that a proposal to create comprehensive treatmentalternative summaries across the board would be impracticable, she
seems to hint at the possibility of using summaries in specified high
stakes areas to supplement contract-based informed consent
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theories. 2 12 Whether such a supplementation might indeed be
possible is an intriguing question.
Undoubtedly, however, the greatest success of Krause's proposal
is its recommendation of the use of professional disciplinary
proceedings in policing disclosure.213 Professional disciplinary
proceedings offer the strong advantage of effective deterrence of
214
improper nondisclosure while minimizing stress on the tort system.
Simultaneously, professional discipline has the appeal of bringing
added legitimacy to dignitary injuries, which the tort system does not
strongly protect, but which are at the very heart of the autonomy
interests that underlie informed consent doctrine. 2 15 The idea of
using professional disciplinary procedures exclusively except where
physical injury results from nondisclosure thus has some promise. 216
Finally, a criticism of Professor Mark Hall's economic theory may
be justifiable. According to Professor Krause, Hall's theory calls for
permitting patients and providers to contract out of the tort system;
"[t]o the extent that judges are bound by the common law of informed
consent, however, it is not clear that they would be free to recognize
such a contractual waiver. '2 17 There is some validity to this point,
especially considering the apparent judicial distrust of cost
containment incentives affecting disclosure. 2 18 To the extent that
Hall's theory would not be supported judicially, legislative action may
be needed. And yet, given the foundational self-determination
interests underlying informed consent doctrine in the United States,
one could make a strong argument for judicial enforcement of
disclosure bargaining. Finally, as Schuck has indicated, one possible
bargaining option under a contract theory is bargaining for
alternative dispute resolution. 219 Perhaps a forum more disposed to
enforcing individual bargaining in this area can be chosen.
Regardless of whether it is judicially or statutorily achieved,
however, Professor Hall's economic theory of informed consent offers
an appealing analytical framework for analyzing informed consent in
today's managed care environment. As Schuck points out, allowing
individuals to contract regarding preferred disclosure standards
promotes individual autonomy and self-determination, the core
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interests that comprise the foundation upon which informed consent
is established in the United States. 220 Thus, under appropriate
circumstances, the law should enforce such bargains.2 2 1 It makes no
which champions choice to limit patients' ability
sense for a doctrine
222
to exercise choice.
Wolf criticizes Hall's formulation of the issue as too narrow: "Is
the doctor-patient dialogue required by the doctrine of informed
consent at the point of treatment diminished by prior or presumed
consent to certain treatment limitations or allocation rules at the
point of subscribing to the health plan?" 22 3 Rather, Wolf claims, a
systemic analysis is needed. 224 Hall's informed consent theory,
however, arguably addresses systemic concerns by expanding the
class of appropriate disclosure settings beyond the point of treatment
to include the point of enrollment. 225 To be sure, Hall's proposal
advocates more modest disclosure than Wolf s, but it is no less
systemic.
Professor Krause adds an additional criticism, namely that
Hall's contract theory, which excludes high stakes and value-laden
decisions, is so limited in scope as to be more descriptive than
prescriptive in nature.2 26 The claim is that limitation of the theory to
everyday care of marginal benefit does not address the locus of the
problem. 227 Is it not beyond argument, however, that such everyday
decisions comprise the lion's share of disclosure contexts? And does
not a minute of physician dialogue cost the same whether it is spent
in discussion of aspirin versus ibuprofen or in discussion of
chemotherapy versus radiation therapy? It stands to reason that
reducing the level of physician dialogue in the everyday setting goes
to the heart of the cost-containment aspiration. Furthermore, it
seems apparent that in the context of high stakes decisionmaking,
where the informational costs tend to be relatively low in comparison
to the likely eventual treatment costs, more robust disclosure is
justified, especially given the importance of the decisions being made.
To the extent that physician dialogue currently resembles that
envisioned by Hall's proposal, that is well; however, as we have seen,
courts' judgments of the sufficiency of such dialogue are
unpredictable. 228 In an uncertain and litigious environment, it is
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hardly likely that all physicians, whose actions are so often motivated
by a desire for liability avoidance, feel free to reduce disclosure even
for low stakes decisions. A legal framework that provides certainty for
physicians based on contractual disclosure obligations would indeed
add value to the current situation.
Furthermore, an economic theory of informed consent, if properly
laid down, ought to encourage the development of Wolf s feedback
loops, such that medical consumers can exercise informed judgments
of plan and provider quality. 229 If patients truly are globally informed
at enrollment and reenrollment,23 0 and if providers are obliged to
respond truthfully to patient questioning, 231 and if complete
information regarding rules that govern plan decision makers is
made available upon request, 23 2 patients who desire to gauge the
desirability of their plan and provider have all the necessary tools at
their disposal. It is true that contractual consent theory likely is not
justifiable if full disclosure is not made at the proper times or if
information is not readily available to plan members; however,
neither Hall nor this Author advocates that plans be free to "hide the
233
ball" in such a way.
Although Krause's article in some ways eschews a contract
theory of informed consent, some of her ideas may indeed provide
useful building blocks for improving upon such a theory. As noted
above, Krause indicated that standardized summaries of treatment
options for particular high-stakes medical conditions could
supplement a contract model of informed consent. 234 As Hall himself
notes, it is likely that medical decisions regarding such conditions
necessitate further disclosure, even in the face of the less-disclosure
preferences of some patients. 23 5 Perhaps comprehensive summaries
like those contained in the breast cancer statutes could aid disclosure
efforts in this context.
Perhaps the most important potential addition to the contract
theory would be Krause's suggestion of the use of professional
disciplinary proceedings to police some disclosure violations. 23 6 The
beauty of a contract theory of informed consent is its synergy with the
traditional doctrine, in that it aims to promote patient autonomy and
self-determination. To the extent that patient autonomy is to be
furthered, however, the law ought to deter even merely dignitary
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violations of autonomy. 237 Further strain, however, on the tort system
in the current environment of myriad tort reform efforts would seem
an improper avenue for vindicating dignitary interests, thus
highlighting the need for vamped-up professional discipline. Utilizing
professional disciplinary proceedings to address disclosure violations
would accomplish the goal of deterrence of such violations while
avoiding needless tort litigation. 238 Furthermore, disciplining
providers for disclosure violations causing only dignitary harm
vindicates and legitimizes autonomy and self-determination. 239 To
the extent that physicians cause measurable physical harm to
patients by failing to disclose, such violations could be handled under
the existing tort system, 240 contractually determined ADR, or
statutorily determined mechanisms. Of course, to avoid needless
wasting of judicial resources, rules determining the proper forum for
dispute resolution would be necessary. Otherwise patients suffering
dignitary harms would likely be tempted to seek tort relief in the
hopes of receiving monetary damage awards. Perhaps the traditional
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim would be sufficient;
however, it may be that a more concrete and uniform standard for
determining the appropriate resolution forum would be more
suitable.
Thus, this Note concludes that a contract theory of informed
consent provides the proper framework for setting disclosure
standards in the United States. Such a model achieves a systemic
focus while furthering patient autonomy and self-determination by
allowing patients to bargain for their preferred types of disclosure.
Furthermore, such a model insists on accessibility of information for
patients, ensuring that the feedback loops so necessary for consumer
quality control are present. Although Professor Hall envisions a
judicial enforcement model, it may well be that statutory intervention
or contractual choice of forum is necessary to ensure certainty of
contractual enforcement. Finally, some supplementary items would
arguably approve upon a contract approach. The creation of
standardized treatment-option summaries for common high-stakes
medical decisions would aid physician efforts to ensure adequate
disclosure in these settings. Furthermore, the inclusion of a
professional discipline component, perhaps achieved statutorily, in a
contract model would further vindicate the autonomy interests that
virtually all agree are vital while limiting provider liability for
monetary damages.
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IV. "INFORMED CONSENT" IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: BOLAM AND ITS
PROGENY

As stated above, the United Kingdom's healthcare system is not
characterized by the drastic spending that plagues the U.S. system.
Several aspects of the British system contribute to its manageable
spending situation.
The first and most obvious difference between the United
Kingdom's healthcare delivery system and that of the United States
is that the former is a public system, while the latter is largely
private. In the United Kingdom, medical care is viewed as a public
good and, as a corollary of that country's governmental provision of
healthcare, overall medical spending is limited by a set healthcare
budget. 24 1 Clearly, this capped-spending approach limits healthcare
spending across the board, probably affecting every category of
medical treatment. Capped spending, however, arguably plays an
even greater role in limiting spending in those areas where the cost of
treatment probably does not justify its likely benefit. Because of
capped spending, U.K. physicians and policymakers are forced to
make allocation decisions with regard to concededly scarce resources;
in other words, they have to make cost-benefit determinations.
Therefore, where treatment costs would naturally tend to exceed
treatment benefits-that is, where treatment makes little economic
sense-these determinations would result in greatly reduced
utilization.
A cultural factor cited as leading to lower spending in the United
Kingdom is the fact that British society tends to view death as
acceptable, rather than as professional failure. 242 Physicians and
243
patients alike consider death to be both natural and necessary.
Thus, British physicians, in addition to being forced to make costbenefit decisions as to the relative value of potential treatments for
dying patients, are also less encumbered by the intense desire to
preserve life at all costs which often characterizes U.S. medical
care. 244 It is interesting to note that the United Kingdom was the
birthplace of the hospice care movement. 245 Annas and Miller
correctly characterize the hospice movement as "reject[ing] heroic
medical treatment and [as being] openly designed to ease the natural
'246
transition to death.
It is also argued that the United Kingdom's more collective
notions of healthcare entitlement decrease spending in its healthcare
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system. Because Britons do not consider themselves to be
autonomous consumers of medical care as a private good, but rather
perceive themselves (correctly) as members of a collective pool who
have to "divvy up" the scarce healthcare resources with one another,
they tend to demand less treatment than their neighbors across the
2 47
Atlantic.
Relatedly, lower levels of spending in the United Kingdom are
often attributed to the more professional-favoring British informed
consent standards. English law does not purport to recognize the
doctrine of informed consent. 248 Under the oft-cited rule handed down
in the Bolam case, however, doctors' decisions regarding disclosure of
the risks of treatment and non-treatment are handled under the ambit
of medical negligence and are traditionally afforded deference so long
as the doctors can be said to have acted "in accordance with a practice
accepted at the time as proper by a responsible body of medical opinion
skilled in [that] particular form of treatment. '249 For the most part,
2 50
this rule holds true today.
While the Bolam test at first appears to be similar to the
predominant U.S. disclosure standards (outlined in Part IV), upon
further investigation it is seen to be more deferential to the physician.
The "reasonable-physician" standard utilized by the majority of U.S.
jurisdictions attempts to ascertain a particular disclosure standard
attributable to the medical community and holds the physician to
that standard, while the second most common U.S. standard, which is
patient- rather than professional-based, is even less deferential to
physicians. In contrast, the Bolam test defers to physicians'
disclosure judgments so long as those judgments are accepted by any
2 51
responsible body of medical men.
252
Maynard v. West Midlands Regional Health Authority
clarified the extent of this deference to physicians. In Maynard, the
House of Lords stated that "a judge's 'preference' for one body of
distinguished professional opinion to another also professionally
distinguished is not sufficient to establish negligence in a practitioner
whose actions have received the seal of approval of those whose
opinions . . .were not preferred."2 5 3 In other words, a judge who
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deems the patient's evidence more credible than the practitioner's
cannot impose liability so long as that practitioner produces any
respectable medical opinion approving of his conduct.2 54 Taken
together with some commentators' observations that defendants often
produced rather questionable evidence in the hopes of its being
considered respectable, the "Maynard principle" operates to tie
judges' hands in cases where the defense evidence is much less
credible than the plaintiffs evidence but nevertheless is considered
255
part of some respectable body of medical opinion.
2 56
The Defrietas v. O'Brien case
appeared to make it even more
difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in English informed consent cases.
Defrietas seemed to hold that defendants could invoke the Maynard
principle by merely adducing evidence from one or two experts known
to be on the fringes of acceptable medical practice. 257 It appears,
however, that Defrietas has not had much effect on English informed
consent litigation. 258 In fact, the House of Lords has indicated in
dictum that the mere fact that the defendant has brought evidence
from a number of experts who genuinely believe his decision was
appropriate does not require a court to hold that the defendant
escapes liability; rather the court must be satisfied that the experts,
in reaching their opinions, "have directed their minds to the question
of comparative risks and benefits and have reached a defensible
conclusion on the matter. '259 The House of Lords has made it clear,
however, that defense experts' opinions will fail to defeat the
plaintiffs case only in the rare case where a judge determines that
260
those opinions cannot be logically supported.
Some inroads were arguably made into the Bolam test's
deference to professionals in Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the
Bethlem Royal Hospital.2 6 1 In Sidaway, Lord Bridge and Lord Keith
agreed in dictum that when a patient specifically questions a
physician about treatment risks, the physician must answer honestly
and "as fully as the questioner requires. '262 Furthermore, Lords
Bridge, Keith, and Templeman suggested that even where no expert
witness contends that the non-disclosure fails to conform to accepted
practice, the judge might come to the conclusion that disclosure "was
so obviously necessary to an informed choice . . .that no reasonably
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judges are free to stray from the Bolam test in reality, however, is as
yet unclear.
It is not surprising that the United Kingdom affor'ds such great
authority to treating physicians in view of the gatekeeping function of
British general practitioners. 264 Because physicians control the
decision whether a patient will see a specialist for further treatment,
and thereby are responsible for controlling costs, they are vested with
greater authority relative to patients than their U.S. counterparts.
26 5
Patient knowledge encourages patient autonomy.
V. WHAT SHOULD INFORMED CONSENT LOOK LIKE IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM?
Informed consent law in the United Kingdom is understandably
less developed than its U.S. counterpart. 26 6 Some point to the
historical need to implicitly ration healthcare resources in a system
with capped spending as the explanation for this condition. 26 7 As was
alluded to above, this view is valid. In Britain, where capped public
spending is the hallmark of healthcare, general practitioners function
as gatekeepers, filtering true patient need from mere patient demand
for limited specialty and high-tech care. 268 Such a filtering role
naturally
engenders
a
narrower
scope
for
individual
decisionmaking. 269 Thus, it is not surprising that English law favors
the professional on the disclosure issue. 2 70 Maintenance of low costs
in the British system is achieved in part by discouraging disclosure,
which in turn discourages patient autonomy and encourages the
collectivist notions that lead British patients to demand less
utilization.
Annas and Miller argue that the relative homogeneity of English
culture as compared with the United States also argues for reposing
more trust in English professionals to make medical decisions for
their patients. 271 Where greater homogeneity is present, we expect
more cultural agreement regarding treatment decisions, making
disclosure less important. 272 In the United States, on the other hand,
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where cultural diversity is high and a wider economic and spiritual
gulf exists between patients and physicians, the law may need to
more carefully protect disclosure given the infrequency of shared
273
values.
Furthermore, increased disclosure despite decreased options due
to capped spending could be considered inhumane.27 4 With respect to
U.S. informed consent policy, it is often argued that paternalistic
physicians have no right to neglect to disclose treatment options
simply because they are not covered, for the physician never knows
what resources the patient might have at his disposal to purchase a
noncovered treatment outside of the plan. 275 Such a concern does not
apply in a capped public system like that in the United Kingdom,
where medical choice is limited by limitations on supply.2 76 In such a
setting, informing patients about potentially beneficial but financially
unattainable treatment options
might well be considered
inhumane. 277 Of course, this is a paternalistic argument. Standing in
contrast to this argument is the argument that nondisclosure of
unavailable options forecloses the possibility of procedural coverage
appeals 2 78
or mobilization of public opinion against the
noncoverage.2 79 These procedural and political concerns do apply in
the U.K. context, although the potential to have coverage denials
overturned there is unclear. At any rate, the argument for requiring
disclosure of noncovered alternatives seems somewhat weaker in the
United Kingdom than in the United States.
Still, it can be argued that the United Kingdom's deference to
professionals is explainable in less justifiable terms. Specifically,
some view this deference as an indefensible carryover from the
Victorian era-an extension of the traditional English tenet that
"Nanny knows best. ' 280 (In fact, an Australian Supreme Court judge
criticized the Bolam test using these very terms.28 1 ) The Bolam test
has been criticized as having grown out of the class hierarchy system
of early English society and the unwillingness of the legal profession
to allow ordinary people to challenge the rules of the medical
282
profession.
How should disclosure obligations in the United Kingdom
compare and contrast with those in the United States? Should not
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British patients have the same right of self-determination that
American patients enjoy? At the same time, is it not relevant that the
role of general practitioners as gatekeepers is necessary in the United
Kingdom's public healthcare delivery system?
As Lord Scarman indicated in his Sidaway dissent, the right of
self-determination inheres in patients in the United Kingdom just as
it does in patients in the United States. 283 Scarman recommended a
move to a patient-based standard like the one announced in
Canterbury v. Spence. 28 4 Such a move would clearly vindicate patient
autonomy to a degree, but would arguably fail to adequately serve the
need to conserve resources of physician time in a capped-spending
environment.
In truth, the United Kingdom's capped spending system operates
much like U.S. managed care's capitation model. 28 5 Britain has
indeed been capitating its general practitioners ever since the
National Health System (NHS) was created in 1948,286 so that in
many ways the NHS operates as the functional equivalent of an
HMO.
It stands to reason, then, that an informed consent proposal in
the United States might contain some valuable lessons for the United
Kingdom. This Note proposes for the United Kingdom many of the
same recommendations asserted for the United States in the area of
informed consent. Specifically, this Note prescribes (in addition to
current British disclosure practices) the aforementioned concepts of
(1) one-time global non-physician disclosure in the year that citizens
reach the age of majority, so that citizens fully understand the system
in which their medical decisions are being made; (2) the availability
upon request of information regarding the rules governing
decisionmakers; (3) a requirement of honest answers to patient
questioning; and (4) a system of professional discipline to apply where
harms caused by nondisclosure are purely dignitary. In addition, a
fifth element is advocated for specific application to the U.K. system:
establishment of a legal duty of care to comply with disclosure
requirements (1), (2), and (3) above in addition to the physicianoriented duty already in place under Bolam.
The need for a contract-based approach is not necessary or
applicable in the United Kingdom, because cost-containment there is
already being achieved pursuant to a longstanding tradition of public
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rationing. In the United States, by way of contrast, a longstanding
tradition of unlimited spending is being corrected by costcontainment measures in the private sector through managed care,
making the contract enforcement theory an essential element of an
effective U.S. informed-consent model.
This model would vindicate the autonomy interests of British
patients by enabling them to understand the environment in which
they are giving or withholding consent. Thus, if a patient prefers to
accept the treatment recommended in a particular situation "at face
value," he can do so. If, however, he prefers to know more information
about treatment options, he is free to ask, and the physician is bound
to answer honestly. Furthermore, if he wants to learn more about the
rules to which a general practitioner is subject and the incentives
that affect his judgment, he can request the appropriate information.
Regardless of the patient's choice regarding information in any given
treatment setting, it is his choice, not the choice of a paternalistic
professional.
This model also furthers patient autonomy by providing for the
aforementioned employment of professional disciplinary proceedings
as a mechanism to deter illegal nondisclosure. As discussed,
professional discipline has the value of deterring informed consent
violations while conserving the resources of the tort system.
Furthermore, this model is consistent with the need for the
efficient use of the U.K.'s capped healthcare resources. Physicians
will be free to go about their day-to-day practices as they did before,
subject only to the Bolam standard. Granted, they will be required to
honestly answer patient inquiries regarding unavailable treatment
options and risks, but it is doubtful that they are currently legally
permitted to lie in the face of direct questioning. Thus, general
practitioners' time will be used just as efficiently as it is today. The
major costs created by this model are the expense of global disclosure
and the expense of litigation under the newly created legal duty.
The expense of global disclosure would not be insubstantial;
however, the major portion of the costs will be borne at the outset.
Maintaining an already-established global disclosure mechanism
should not be overly expensive. Regardless, the cost of one-time global
disclosure, coupled with the on demand availability of rule
documentation, is a small price to pay for the legitimization of
patients' interest in autonomy and self-determination. When such
disclosure should take place is a matter which requires consideration.
In the managed care context, global disclosure takes place at
enrollment and reenrollment. 28 7 There is no analogous event in
Britain, however, where every citizen is covered by NHS from

287.

See Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, supra note 84, at 582.

20061

A TALE OF TWO COUNTRIES

birth. 28 8 This Author proposes the age of legal majority in the United
Kingdom as the proper time for global disclosure to take place.
Mechanically, such disclosure could take the form of a mandated, oneday class taught by paraprofessionals from NHS at various locations
across the United Kingdom, or perhaps a video distributed to each
citizen when he or she attains majority.
The expense of litigation under the new legal duty would
likewise be worth the cost. The reasoning behind such a legal duty is
that it provides much needed redress for patients who have suffered
legitimate physical injuries due to physician nondisclosure. As this
Note has discussed, Britain's current deference to physicians in
professional negligence cases has the potential to deny redress even
to patients who, in the mind of the judge, have been wronged. Under
the proposed model however, patients who are harmed as a result of a
violation of the legal disclosure standards laid out above would be
able to state a prima facie case of professional negligence. In this way,
the common sense "smell test" would not be subverted as easily by
technical application of the Bolam test. At the same time, the legal
duty would be clear enough to avoid a blurring of the legal standard:
any claimant alleging a breach of this duty must prove that his
physician violated one of the legal disclosure requirements, as
administratively or statutorily written, and that the violation legally
caused compensable injury to the plaintiff.
Thus, we see that the models for informed consent in the United
States and the United Kingdom can be remarkably similar because of
the two systems' shared interests in containing costs and furthering
autonomy. One time global disclosure and subsequent full availability
of rules, incentives, and structural information enables patients to
exercise choice in determining how much they prefer to know about
their treatment options and the rules and incentives that affect
decision makers and general practitioners. The use of professional
disciplinary proceedings deters violations and legitimizes patients'
right to self-determination, while not increasing tort liability. Finally,
the creation of a new legal standard based on these new disclosure
policies enables patients who clearly have been harmed by violative
nondisclosure to have redress when the Bolam test might not
otherwise do so.
VI. CONCLUSION

As this Note has demonstrated, the U.S. healthcare system is
very different from that of the U.K. The U.S. system is largely
private, and its informed consent doctrine is highly developed and
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characterized by a strong desire to promote autonomy. In addition,
America has only begun in the last half century to pull itself out of a
morass of overspending engendered by years of cost-pass-through
insurance and fee-for-service medicine. That movement is most
strongly evidenced by managed care.
In contrast, the U.K.'s system of capped public spending on
healthcare has enabled it to effectively control its costs by controlling
the amount spent industry-wide. As healthcare costs rise, however,
British concerns to maintain low spending levels are very real. In
fact, Britain's gatekeeper approach is functionally equivalent to
capitation in U.S. managed care. This brings British concerns in line
with American concerns to a large extent. Furthermore, the interests
in autonomy and self-determination have been recognized by many in
the United Kingdom as important, aligning British aims even more
with American aims.
An effective model for informed consent policy in the United
States is the contract theory of informed consent. This entails not
merely enforcement of contracts over treatment-point disclosure
levels, but also global disclosure at enrollment and reenrollment, and
effective availability of further information about plan rules and
incentives. In addition, assigning a stronger role to professional
disciplinary proceedings in the informed-consent context is an
effective way to deter improper nondisclosure while avoiding strain
on the tort system.
A well-developed model of informed consent in the United
Kingdom would incorporate each of these characteristics, with the
exception of the contract theory, which is inapplicable to the public
health delivery context. Finally, another useful-addition to the U.K.
informed consent regime would be the creation of a cause of action
based on violation of the proposed disclosure standards, so that
legitimate claims that slip through the cracks of the Bolam test can
be properly redressed.
It is possible to achieve patient autonomy and self-determination
while effectively containing healthcare costs. Each of these aims is
worthy of aspiration, and it is clear that a well-developed theory of
informed consent can adequately further both of these objectives.
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